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Abstract
This thesis aims to clarify the obscure perception about tax havens being well-governed countries. Empirical
studies on tax havens usually take a dichotomous approach whereby a jurisdiction is either a tax haven or
not. We argue that this approach is of little value considering there is no common and overall accepted
definition of tax havens. Previous literature has given too much attention to small and insignificant tax
havens, while large economies have gone unnoticed. We challenge the dichotomous approach and contribute
to the tax haven literature using the Financial Secrecy Index as our dependent variable. With this new
measure, we turn to examine the determinants of tax haven status, and we do not find a significant and
identifiable chain of causation for the relationship between tax haven status and governance quality. Thus,
we can disprove some of the findings from Dharmapala and Hines (2009), regarded by many as the most
influential evidence on the relationship between governance and tax havens. However, we find supporting
evidence for a low degree of corruption as important for tax haven status. This finding suggests that tax
havens’ credibility to attract financial capital is closely attached to a low degree of corruption, at least on
paper. Finally, evidence shows that large developed economies with oversized financial centers suffer from
the country capture phenomenon. Rather than serving the economy, large financial centers now prey on it,
eventually undermining governance and institutional quality.
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In light of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the disclosure of the Panama papers in 2016, the world has
awoken to the sobering facts regarding the impact tax havens impose on the world economy. Tax havens
alone are estimated to be responsible for the loss of approximately US 500-600 billion dollars of tax revenue
a year (Shaxson, 2019). While the issue is more prominent in developing countries, the United States and
the United Kingdom are also subjected to negative externalities from tax havens. However, the public has
a confused understanding of tax havens today. In fact, according to Cobham et al. (2015), the United
Kingdom is the most detrimental tax haven in the world with all of its overseas territories and dependencies.
While the general view of tax havens’ destructive consequences seems to be similar, it continues to be quite
vague what characterizes a tax haven and which nations have become tax havens. This is where our research
comes into play, attempting to clarify the determinants on which countries become tax havens.
The literature is primarily focused on cross-sectional data and dichotomous reasoning, where most of
the literature is based on a list of tax havens created by Hines and Rice (1994). We argue that such a
dichotomous approach is of little value, given that no standard and generally accepted definition of tax
havens exists and that since 1994, the number of tax havens has expanded. Therefore, we use the Financial
Secrecy Index1, which incorporates a qualitative institutional indicator and a measure of a nation’s share
of the global market for financial services provided to non-residents. A continuous measure of secrecy and
tax haven status is therefore obtained, which can possibly provide better recognition as the question is
re-examined: what makes a tax haven?
A significant positive correlation between governance quality and tax haven status is found in previous
literature on tax haven determinants. Dharmapala and Hines (2009), henceforth DH2009, have contributed
the most to tax haven literature and claims that tax havens are small, affluent island economies with a
substantial service sector and less natural resources than nonhavens.2 This is, in our opinion, an outdated
perception regarding tax havens and does not accurately represent the reality.
We argue that it is the large and seemingly “clean” countries that are the worst tax havens and that the
significant positive relationship between governance and the classification of tax havens is incorrect. This
assertion is supported by the Tax Justice Network, which in its latest edition of the Financial Secrecy Index
has revealed a certain confused perception of tax havens. According to the Tax Justice Network (2020a),
privileged OECD member countries and their satellites are the key beneficiaries or conductors of these legal
and illegal flows.
Furthermore, we suspect that tax havens have become victims of an aggressive financial sector, with the
ability to relocate their mobile capital almost instantly. Thus, leading to mobile capital holders obtaining
an edge on tax haven governments. This is because tax havens will only reap the advantages of mobile
capital that they cannot reap as nonhavens or when not selected as the favored tax haven. We think
this contributes to some handshake deals that are more consistent with a society that is politically and
economically captured. Where according to Shaxson and Christensen (2013), a politically and economically
captured jurisdiction is easily manipulated by lobbyists, and where the excessive financial sector dismantles
other sectors, thus ruining the marketplace for other industries. Consequently, we presume that the double-
1The Financial Secrecy Index and the FSI value will be used interchangeably in the thesis.
2DH2009 claims that these characteristics of tax havens are well-documented in the literature.
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edged stability criterion3 is essential in any tax haven. This implies that tax havens must appear to be
stable and well regulated. Otherwise, mobile capital holders would relocate. However, the finance sector
must also be protected from government scrutiny, thus ensuring that global mobile capital holders are
anonymous. This entails that tax havens have to turn a blind eye to certain transactions or activities that
occur, which is not compatible with being characterized as a well-governed country. Overall, it seems that
such a government has to be relatively pliable in order to attract and retain mobile capital within the
jurisdiction.
To test our theory, we first replicated DH2009 main results with 2004 data. Subsequently, we used the same
approach with recent data from 2019. We then used a continuous measure of secrecy, where the Financial
Secrecy Index value and the secrecy score are employed as dependent variables. To measure the effect of
time-variant variables, we applied a fixed effects regression and used panel data. In particular, we wanted
to measure governance over time, thus tax haven status, since the level of governance is obviously changing
over time with natural election cycles. We also generated a fixed effects model for our panel data due to
the possibility of omitted variables associated with tax haven status and governance in our model.
In particular, if extended to more recent data, the association found by DH2009 is no longer present, with
neither ordinary least squares (OLS) or a fixed effects model. However, we find that corruption is positively
correlated with the Financial Secrecy Index and thereby, able to confirm DH2009 findings in regards to
how local corruption affects tax haven likelihood. We interpret this as evidence that in order to attract
financial capital, countries have to commit not to expropriate foreign investors.4
Nonetheless, there is one potential issue with the significant positive relationship we find between the
Financial Secrecy Index and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Specifically, traditional indexes such
as the CPI are focused on experts’ opinions, usually professors, major business executives, and government
individuals. Because perceptions are not inherently factual, but rather viewpoints of certain individuals,
these typically vary among various classes in a population. Therefore, only collecting answers from one
group leads to a potential selection bias in the index. Since we believe that tax havens may suffer from
economic and political capture, the CPI is potentially exaggerated because governments in tax havens are
aware that a perceived impression of low corruption impacts the inflow of mobile capital. Thus we cannot
guarantee that the levels of corruption the CPI shows is an accurate picture of the reality. Throughout the
thesis, we show convincing examples of an overly excessive financial sector’s impact on a government and
clearly show that a major tax haven like Jersey seems to have a misleadingly low score on corruption.5
Our findings in this thesis shows no positive association between the quality of governance and tax haven
status, which contradicts popular literature. However, we argue that even if the governance index had
become significant, it would have captured too much of the local conditions, which is not inherently impor-
tant considering tax haven status. It is the treatment of foreign mobile capital holders that is key, not the
local circumstances, considering tax haven status. However, make no mistake, in order to create a favorable
environment for foreign mobile capital investors, a certain degree of governance clearly needs to be in place.
Nonetheless, we argue that it is misleading to suggest that a constant increase in local governance should
3The double-edged stability requirement by Shaxson and Christensen (2013) ) implies that “financial centers need stability
and the appearance of probity, or the money will flee.” This alongside a reassurance that the local government will not interfere
and hinder the financial sector’s needs.
4The fact that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are reduced as corruption rises is well established in the literature.
5The CPI does not measure the corruption in Jersey, but Kaufmann and Kray (2019) report a score for Channel Islands
on corruption. The Channel Islands consists of Bailwick of Jersey and the Bailwick of Guernsey, these two separate units are
treated as one due to restricted data availability.
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have a favorable effect on tax haven status. Henry (2012) puts it in perspective, “we will not steal your
money - but we won’t kick up a fuss if you steal other people’s money.” This highlights that tax havens
only have to create an efficient and trustworthy ring-fenced legislation6 to attract foreign mobile capital.
And currently, portraying the image of having low levels of local corruption seems to be the only aspect of
institutions that impacts tax haven status.
Section 2 of this thesis describe the data we have applied in the forthcoming analysis. Section 3 shows the
regression techniques we apply. Section 4 analyses how governance and other institutional measures affect
tax havens. Section 5 contains a discussion where we propose an alternative hypothesis into what makes a
tax haven. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Theoretical background
The connection between governance and institutional quality to the probability of a country becoming a
tax haven is explored in several research studies. In empirical research, it seems to be a common perception
that tax havens are well-governed countries since otherwise, tax havens would not be able to attract foreign
mobile capital. The most influential studies on the topic are arguably DH2009, but Rose and Spigel (2007)
have also contributed to the literature. DH2009 uses a dichotomous approach that classifies a nation as
a tax haven or not and applies cross-sectional data to analyze how governance quality affects tax haven
status. Their findings suggest that governance quality is crucial for a country trying to attract capital and
become a tax haven. Finally, they conclude that tax havens are small affluent countries with high-quality
governance institutions. Rose and Spigel (2007) used the governance index components to investigate the
determinants of tax havens. They found no significant relationship between tax haven status and political
stability, nor the rule of law. However, they find evidence for regulatory quality being crucial for a country
to become a tax haven.
DH2009 and Rose and Spigel (2007) give too much attention to small insignificant tax havens in their
empirical research, while large tax havens like the United States are overlooked. We challenge this approach
and contribute to the tax haven literature by using the Financial Secrecy Index as our dependent variable
of interest when examining the determinants of tax havens. Furthermore, we use fixed effects regression
on panel data to control for unobservable time-specific and individual effects. This allows us to control for
omitted variable bias in a more precise manner, compared to the cross-sectional study done by DH2009.7
6Ring-fencing is a system where separate rules and laws apply to non-residents (Schjelderup, 2015).
7Section 4.2 provides a deeper insight into possible issues in utilizing cross-sectional data and ensuring causal inferences




In this section, we describe our data and descriptive evidence. Data sources and a complete list of all
variables are provided in appendix A.
2.1 Tax havens
Tax havens are jurisdictions that offer favorable terms for wealthy individuals, criminals, and corporations.
There are no clear cut definitions for tax havens, and names like offshore financial center and secrecy
jurisdictions are used interchangeably. In the tax haven literature, tax havens are generally described
as low, or nil tax environments with low transparency, which is often referred to as secrecy or private
information, and no requirement of local presence (Schjelderup, 2015). Increased attention has recently
been given to low transparency among tax havens, particularly after the disclosure of Panama papers in
April 2016, which leaked information about more than 214,488 offshore companies.
The business model of tax havens is to construct complex legal regimes to empower secrecy. Nonetheless,
the objective is relatively simple - companies such as banks and other financial institutions are allowed
to accept capital from anywhere, without disclosing any information about its origin (Global Financial
Integrity, 2019). Without any obligations to disclose this information, tax havens are ideal for anyone in
need of somewhere to hide capital. Thus, tax havens are the perfect place for criminals, as banks will accept
their “dirty” money without asking too many questions.
Numerous multinational firms use tax havens to lower their tax-bill. This is known as tax avoidance and
compared to tax-evasion, it is legal. By using complicated corporate structures involving holding companies
and lawyers, loopholes are utilized - shifting profits to tax havens. The most well-known tax evasion tactic
is “the double Irish Dutch sandwich” formerly employed by Google’s European headquarters in Ireland,
which used a holding company in the Netherlands to move profits to Bermuda.
To examine the determinants of tax havens, three dependent variables are applied. The first variable is tax
haven status, which is a binary variable, that is based on the predefined list of tax havens used by DH2009.8
The second variable is the Financial Secrecy Index, our primary variable of interest in this thesis. Lastly,
the secrecy score is applied, which is a sub-component of the Financial Secrecy Index.
2.1.1 Financial Secrecy Index
The Financial Secrecy Index is an annual political ranking of jurisdictions according to their degree of
financial secrecy. The Financial Secrecy Index uses multiple measures to examine countries’ transparency,
wherein in our research, both the secrecy score and the FSI value are applied. Specifically, the secrecy score
consists of qualitative data of laws, regulations, and exchange of information. At the same time, the FSI
value combines the secrecy score with a global scale weight component, which measures a jurisdiction share
of the international cross-border financial transactions provided to non-residents (Tax Justice Network,
2020b). A high secrecy score is typically associated with unwillingness to exchange and share information
with other national authorities and a lack of transparency in the public and private sector. Along with
great facilitation of money-laundering, these characteristics are often associated with tax havens, according
to the Tax Justice Network (2020b).
8Go to appendix B, for a complete list of all the countries included as tax havens.
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Through utilizing the FSI value, the “big players” can be assessed, which contrasts typical lists of tax havens
that tend to focus on smaller jurisdictions. However, their impact on the global economy is somewhat
insignificant (Tax Justice Network, 2020c). The larger countries, and not necessarily those associated with
being a tax haven, make up most of the global share of cross-border financial transactions. Thus, using the
Financial Secrecy Index, which incorporates secrecy and the potential “damage” a nation can contribute
to, is most suitable for our research purpose.
Critiques of the Financial Secrecy Index are mostly about the scale weighting component (Tax Justice
Network, 2020c). By scaling, The United States jumps from the 73rd position on the secrecy score to
become the second-worst offender on the FSI value (Tax Justice Network, 2020a). On the other hand,
Cook Island, which has a higher secrecy score than The United States, is ranked as the least harmful
country at 133 on the FSI value. Therefore, one could argue that larger countries are mistreated simply
due to a larger financial sector. Nonetheless, the FSI value shows that the large countries are the most
harmful when less transparent, and thus what our research will focus on.
Figure 1, shows a chart that displays the FSI value and its specific concentration worldwide. Light blue
implies a high score, while dark blue implies a low score. Finally, grey indicates a lack of data for a
particular country, as the Financial Secrecy Index currently only consists of 133 countries. Looking at the
map, it should be clear that large developed economies, including The United States and Switzerland, are
some of the world´s largest tax havens. Therefore, the misconceived perception that tax havens are only
small islands in the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific should now be clear.




In its simplest form, governance can be defined as “how society or groups within it, organize to make
decisions” (Institute on governance, 2020). The term is broad and refers to how countries, firms, and even
small informal groups function. It is not only about formal delegation of power but also about culture,
norms, and visions. Given its broad definition, it can be challenging to measure and highly dependent on
what aspect of governance is being measured.
2.2.1 Governance index
In this thesis, Kaufmann and Kray (2019) governance index, which measures institutional quality and
traditions within a country, is used. The governance index is our primary variable of interest in this
thesis, and it takes values between -2.5 and 2.5, where a high score indicates a well-governed country. The
variable is normally distributed with a mean equal to zero and unit variance. The score is averaged across
five measures of institutions, as we have excluded one, to replicate DH2009 perfectly. The five indicators
included are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness,
rule of law, and control of corruption. The index is used repeatedly in studies related to government and
institutions. And while many indexes lack data for small tax havens, the governance index provides data
for almost all jurisdictions in the world.9
2.3 Control variables
As control variables, the GDP per capita, population, UN membership, corporate tax rate, and whether a
country is landlocked are used. GDP per capita10 is used to identify that tax havens commonly are more
affluent than nonhavens. The population variable is used to control for a tax haven’s tendency towards
being less populated. Landlocked is a binary variable, equal to 1 if the country is landlocked. Previous
literature has emphasized that tax havens are island economies, with access to the sea as a minimum, which
the variable landlocked will capture (DH2009). UN member is a binary variable equal to one for countries
that have been members of the United Nations throughout our sample period. Using this control variable
enables us to control for sovereignty among the jurisdictions.
Further on, the statutory corporate tax rate is used to extract more of the secrecy components and control for
capital flow, mainly due to low tax rates. Finally, regional dummies are included for Europe, Asia/Pacific,
Central Asia, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East. They are included to control for differences across
regions. This is important, as tax havens can be clustered in particular areas, such as the Caribbean Sea.
Note that “distance by air” which measures the distance between a country’s capital and the nearest city
of New York, Rotterdam, and Tokyo, is left out due to the time-consuming nature of gathering said data
and the inconsequential role it played in DH2009.
2.4 Alternative variables for governance and institutions
In subsection 4.4, other political and institutional factors that may affect the likelihood of a country
becoming a tax haven are discussed. The first on being the Corruption Perceptions Index, which investigates
corruption in a country’s public sector, including political and administrative corruption (Transparency
9The Financial Secrecy Index in 2020 covered 133 jurisdictions, where the governance index had a score for 125 of the
jurisdictions.
10The GDP per capita is adjusted for purchasing power parity and expressed in US dollars
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International 2019a). The index is measured from 0 to 100, where 100 is equal to no corruption. The
second variable is the Business Freedom Index, which captures how efficient and effortless a business can be
started, operated, and closed based on jurisdictions regulations. The variable is based on a scale from 0 to
100, where 100 is equal to the most efficient and freest country to do business in (The Heritage Foundation,
2019).
2.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for both our cross-sectional and panel data. Firstly, one observes
that the averages for the panel data applied in the 2010-2019 sample period are higher than for the cross-
sectional data used in 2004 and 2019. This is mainly due to a lower sample of countries included in the
panel set, due to the Financial Secrecy Index so far not covering all the world’s jurisdictions. Many of the
countries not implemented yet are typically developing countries with weak governance quality. This is why
it can be observed that the governance index is reported with an average of 0.706, which is a significantly
higher score compared to the two other columns in Table 1. Further on, panel data will reinforce this effect
of not including countries situated in the lowest quartile concerning governance quality, thus increasing the
mean. For the secrecy score, one observes a mean of 65, which is relatively high given countries like Spain,
Norway, and Estonia having secrecy scores at 44, implying that the overall transparency for the countries
included is relatively low. Lastly, the tax rate differs significantly among countries, from 0% at its lowest to
over 40%. This shows that it is a diverse group of countries, at least concerning local policies on taxation.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2004 2019 2010 - 2019
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Financial Secrecy Index - - - - 288.906 362.486
Secrecy score - - - - 64.513 13.905
GDP per capita 14,877.780 19,860.280 23,440.440 25,647.290 37,047.730 32,388.240
Population 30,874,575 123,048,181 36,839,090 140,392,732 47,722,258 184,592,309
Governance index −0.036 1.021 −0.022 1.004 0.706 0.786
Corporate tax rate - - - - 21.078 9.859
Corruption Perceptions Index - - - - 57.989 18.625
Business Freedom index - - - - 73.803 13.355
UN member (=1) 0.928 0.259 0.935 0.2607 - -
Landlocked (=1) 0.212 0.409 0.212 0.409 - -
Note: The governance index is normalized to have a mean equal to zero and unit variance; however, there are small deviations
in the summary statistics due to excluding a few countries missing some data. There are 208 countries included in the cross-
sectional data for 2004 and 2019. The panel data is unbalanced with 2 to 5 observations per country for 2010, 2012, 2014,
2017, and 2019. A country in the panel data has on average, 4.07 years of Financial Secrecy Index data reported, with
a corresponding standard deviation of 1.21. The Financial Secrecy Index, secrecy score, GDP per capita, population, and
governance index score have 427 observations. The corporate tax rate has 426 observations; the Corruption Perceptions Index
has 284 observations, while the Business Freedom Index has 309 observations.
In Table 2, one can observe descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples, tax havens, and nonhavens, in
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2019. There are 35 countries classified as tax haven countries and 173 nonhavens. One can immediately
observe that tax havens are more affluent, with an average GDP per capita of 41 343 US dollars, twice
the size of nonhavens. Moreover, tax havens are less populated countries with an average population of 1
635 839, while nonhavens have an average population of 44 026 060. However, it is striking to look at the
disparity between the two sub-samples’ governance index scores. Tax havens have an average score of 0.725,
while nonhavens only have a mean equal to -0.173, implying that tax havens appear to be better-governed
jurisdictions.
Furthermore, UN membership and landlocked confirms common perceptions of tax havens. Such as typical
tax havens being less likely to be independent sovereignty states and more likely to have a coastline. That
is not surprising, as several countries classified as tax havens are a part of the British Overseas Territories,
thus not independent countries.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for tax havens and nonhavens in 2019
Tax havens Nonhavens
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Financial Secrecy Index 35 362.766 376.574 90 221.838 201. 000
Secrecy score 35 69.922 6.994 90 60.789 10.058
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) 35 41,343.790 36,662.590 173 19,818.380 21,154.470
Population 35 1,635,839 2,807,396 173 44,026,060 153,020,310
Governance index 35 0.725 0.706 173 −0.173 0.989
UN member (=1) 35 0.800 0.406 173 0.954 0.211
Landlocked (=1) 35 0.114 0.323 173 0.231 0.423
Note: The summary statistics for tax havens and nonhavens are for 2019. Tax havens are defined after the list in Table 6.
2.6 Descriptive evidence
To further investigate the relationship between governance quality and tax haven status, we will now focus
on the FSI value and secrecy score.
Figure 2 has plotted the Financial Secrecy Index against the governance index, with red dots reflecting
tax havens categorized by DH2009. From Figure 2, we observe what seems to be a positive relationship
between the FSI value and the governance index score, reflected by the black fitted upward-sloping line.
Typical tax havens do not seem to perform better than comparable nonhavens when the entire data set
is assessed. If this would have been the case, then the red dots should have been above the black fitted
line. Nonetheless, if only typical tax havens are applied, one observes a much steeper line than the whole
sample’s fitted line. Which, implies that tax havens are more susceptible to changes in governance quality.
However, when adding nonhavens, the relationship is destroyed or at least much weaker.
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Figure 2: Plot of the Financial Secrecy Index against the governance index
Additionally, Figure 3 has plotted the relationship between the secrecy score and the governance index. The
relationship between the secrecy score and the governance index is negative, reflected by the black fitted
downward-sloping line. Thus, improved governance quality will reduce the secrecy score, meaning that a
well-governed country will more likely comply with international rules and norms. However, it is striking
that most of the tax havens defined by DH2009 are observed above the black fitted line. It seems like tax
havens have a higher degree of secrecy for any level of governance quality. To make it more clear, one can
observe the red fitted line for tax havens only. The red slope is less steep than the black line representing
fitted values for the whole sample. The difference between the slopes’ steepness is consistent with DH2009
findings that tax havens secrecy score is less sensitive to changes in the governance index. Specifically, that
tax havens are continuously more opaque in comparison to nonhavens when governance quality increases.
Also, one observes that very few tax havens have a governance index score below zero, while there is no
clear pattern for the nonhavens. This most likely stems from the fact that a certain level of respect for
property rights has to be in place for any rational individual or company to consider relocating their funds
to an offshore location.
9
2 Data




In this section, we describe our regression techniques and model choice. Robust and clustered standard
errors are used to account for potential problems with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Multi-
collinearity diagnostics can be found in appendix C.
Estimating regressions for the binary dependent variable, tax haven status leaves us with two natural
regression methods, the linear probability model (OLS) and the probit and logistic models based on max-
imum probability estimation. In many practical cases, the linear probability model and the probit and
logit models are indistinguishable. The only difference is that a linear probability model is straightforward
to interpret, while probit and logit models are not. Thus, one should use the linear probability model for
simplicity. In Equation 1 our OLS specification is shown,
THi = β0 + β1Governancei + Xiλ+ εi (1)
where THi is a dichotomous variable for tax haven status for country i, Governancei is the governance
index score for country i and Xi is a vector consisting of all our defined country specific control variables.
For the replication of DH2009, the same model as in Equation 1 is predicted, although with different
parameters. This is seen in Equation 2,
THi = φ(β0 + β1Governancei + Xiλ+ εi) (2)
where φ(z) = P (Z ≤ z), Z ∼ N(0, 1) is the mathematical expression for a normal distribution. The
probability is now forced to be in the range of 0 - 1, typically leading to an S-shaped probability curve.
This is the advantage of probabilistic regression compared to linear probability models, as we do not risk
getting probability results that violate the definition of probability itself.
The question becomes which model is most appropriate for estimating the relationship between tax havens
and a country´s governance index. DH2009 used both models and got consistent results. According to
Long (2007), a rule of thumb is that if the modeled probabilities are extreme, close to 0 or 1, one should
use probit or logic regression. If the probabilities are moderate, typically in the range between 0.2 and 0.8,
one should favor a linear model for interpretation purposes. In our case, we report both types of regressions
for replicating DH2009, while only the linear model for 2019, as there are no extreme probabilities present.
Our analysis on 2019 data, contains one OLS model, and multiple fixed effects models with the Financial
Secrecy Index as our dependent variable. Our OLS model specification is shown in Equation 3,
ln(FSIi) = β0 + β1Governancei + Xiλ+ εi (3)
where the only difference from the specification in Equation 1 and 2 is the left-hand side. Specifically, THi
is replaced with ln(FSIi), which is the logarithm of the Financial Secrecy Index for country i. The FSI
value is expressed in the logarithmic form to account for extreme sample values.
Finally, we apply the following entity and time fixed effects specification, shown in Equation 4,
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Ln(FSIi,t) = B1Governancei,t + Xi,tλ+ δi + θt + εi,t (4)
where Ln(FSIi,t) is the logarithm of the Financial Secrecy Index for country i at time t, δi is the country-
specific effects, and θt is the yearly specific effects. The entity and time fixed effects specifications are
essential as they account for potential unobserved heterogeneity. Note that the same specification is applied




This section describes our empirical findings, focusing on evaluating the relationship between governance
and tax havens, with an OLS and fixed effects model. Examples of why the fixed effects approach is more
fitting than the OLS model is given in subsection 4.2. Furthermore, subsection 4.4 discusses additional
possible institutional measures that may influence the probability of tax haven status. Lastly, several
caveats with the indexes applied in our research are addressed.
4.1 Main result
In Table 3 and column 1, our replication of DH2009 follows. The results show a positive and significant
relationship between the probability of being a tax haven and an increase in the governance index for 2004.
Despite excluding the distance by air variable, our results are similar to theirs. Our replication provides
a significant governance index coefficient of 0.657 at the 5% level, while they report a coefficient of 0.668,
also significant at the 5% level. Thereby, our intention of a nearly perfect replication is achieved.
Additionally, in column 2, one observes a positive and significant governance index coefficient of 0.074 at
the 5% level with an OLS model. DH2009 does not report OLS estimates but explicitly states that both
OLS and probit estimates are magnitude wise about the same. In column 3, data from 2019 are applied,
and one observes that the governance index no longer significantly affects the likelihood of a country being
a tax haven. This result is not consistent with DH2009 and somehow surprising. Therefore, a test to
see if the governance index coefficient in column 2 and 3 differ from each other is performed. The null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, which implies that they are equal. One potential reason for a non-significant
governance index coefficient in column 3 could be that tax havens are more affluent now than in 2004. This
may result in the GDP per capita, capturing a more considerable degree of the effect, but at the expense of
the governance index. It should be noted that the results with a probit model with the same specifications
as in column 3 do lead to a significant relationship between governance and tax haven status. Therefore, it
is at least a reason to believe that their result is not as robust today as in 2004.
Since we are interested in the isolated effect governance has on the likelihood of a country becoming a tax
haven, we study model predictions with two different countries and compare them. Suppose one assumes a
country in Europe that is not landlocked, a UN member, average GDP per capita, and a population of one
million. From this, one can extract the isolated effect of changes in governance quality on the likelihood
of becoming a tax haven. Throughout the thesis, Turkey and Switzerland are used as counterexamples.
Turkey has a governance index score below average, and the political uncertainty leads to fluctuating scores.
In contrast, Switzerland has proven to be one of the most well-functioning countries, consistently at the
top of political rankings. Suppose one assesses the isolated effect of going from a governance index score of
-0.1950 (Turkey) to 1.9592 (Switzerland). In that case, it increases the likelihood of becoming a tax haven
with 33.8 % for the probit model in column 1. The corresponding result for the OLS model in column 2
is 15.9%. The results are very different magnitude wise, and therefore highly dependent on if one assumes
normally distributed or linear probability. The same predictions for column 3 are provided with 2019 data.
The isolated effect of going from a governance index score of -0.6249 (Turkey) to 1.9507 (Switzerland)
increases the likelihood of becoming a tax haven by 14.7%. If one had applied the average population of all
countries of approximately 30 million people in 2004 and 36 million people in 2019, the probabilities would
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have failed for the OLS models. The probit model for 2004 estimates a 0% probability, of the likelihood of
Turkey becoming a tax haven, while Switzerland´s likelihood of becoming a tax haven would be 4%. This
example demonstrates how weak DH2009 results are for changes in the population size. Thus, it is obvious
why they have decided to highlight regression results, where the population is below one million.
Table 3: Regression results - main findings
Dependent variable:
Tax haven (=1) Financial Secrecy Index
2004 2004 2019 2019 2010-2019 2010-2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governance index 0.657∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.057 0.154 0.015 0.045
(0.256) (0.033) (0.039) (0.128)) (0.304) (0.307)
Log of GDP per capita 0.119 0.026 0.042 0.430∗∗∗ 0.652∗ 0.623∗∗
(0.216) (0.031) (0.038) (0.138) (0.350) (0.353)
Log of population −0.402∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.032 0.035
(0.078) (0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.09) (0.088)
UN member (=1) 0.444 0.014 0.034 −0.767∗
(0.416) 0.119) (0.124)) (0.442)
Landlocked (=1) 0.082 0.001 −0.001 0.038
0.367) (0.051) (0.051) (0.228)
Corporate tax rate −0.027∗∗
(0.014)
Constant 0.944∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗ −-1.214
(0.323) (0.376) (1.504)
Model Probit OLS OLS OLS Panel FE Panel FE
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Observations 208 208 208 125 426 426
Number of countries 208 208 208 125 105 105
R2 0.355 0.343 0.375 0.017 0.026
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.309 0.320 −0.329 −0.322
Log Likelihood −51.216
Akaike Inf. Crit. 124.433
Residual Std. Error 0.309 0.312 0.796
F Statistic 10.842∗∗∗ 10.263∗∗∗ 6.829∗∗∗ 1.825 2.092∗
Note: The dependent variable Tax haven (=1), is based on the countries listed in Table 6. The Financial Secrecy Index
is logged, and full coverage of all variables are listed in appendix A. The regression includes regional dummy variables for
Europe, Central Asia, Asia/Pacific, the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa. Robust standard errors in column 1 to 4
and clustered standard errors for column 5 and 6 in parentheses; ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level;
∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level.
In column 4, Table 3, the governance index coefficient has a non-significant effect on the FSI value. On
the other hand, the GDP per capita and population are significant at the 1% level. According to the
results, an increase in the GDP per capita and population of 10% will increase a given country’s FSI value
by 4,30 % and 1,97 %, respectively. Again, one can use Turkey and Switzerland to look at the isolated
effect governance has on the likelihood of a country becoming a tax haven. If one goes from a governance
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index score of -0.6249 (Turkey) to 1.9507 (Switzerland), it increases the FSI value by 95.027 points. This
is equal to approximately 8% of the difference between Switzerland and Turkey’s respective FSI values. It
should be noted that the governance index coefficient is not significant, meaning that one can not reject
the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero.
In the last two columns, panel data and fixed effects are applied. The results show that the governance
index is not significant, nor is the population coefficient. The GDP per capita coefficient is significant at the
10% level for column 5 and at the 5% level for column 6. The coefficient is positive, meaning that wealthy
countries are more likely to have a high FSI value. Adding the corporate tax rate to column 6 provides a
significant coefficient at the 5% level, and the relationship is negative. Not surprisingly, a high corporate tax
rate decreases the FSI value, as tax havens are in general considered as low tax environments. One would
expect the reported coefficient of -0.027 to be magnitude wise more important if the effective corporate tax
rate would have been applied. For instance, Ireland operates with a corporate tax rate of 12.5 %. Still,
findings from Comptroller and auditor general in Ireland (2016) suggest that 13 of the top multinational
firms in the country had effective corporate tax rates below 1 %. Therefore, the coefficient’s magnitude
would be much more significant if the lowest possible corporate income tax rate after all loopholes and
handshake agreements were accounted for.
The isolated effect of going from a governance index score of Turkey to Switzerland is equal to a 1.12%
increase in the FSI value. However, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, meaning that one cannot confirm
that the coefficient is different from zero. The results are very different magnitude wise when applying fixed
effects, as one would expect when controlling for differences among countries and time.
4.2 Criticism of Dharmapala and Hines (2009)
DH2009 provides both extensive and convincing evidence that their results are causal and have high ex-
planatory power. However, there are several issues with their analysis we would like to emphasize. Firstly,
using cross-sectional data restricts the analysis to one given point in time, in this case, the year 2004.
Also, DH2009 claims that tax haven status is highly stable and has no meaningful longitudinal variation in
the measure; hence a cross-sectional approach is appropriate. We agree that tax haven status is relatively
stable considering other lists, among them Palan et al. (2010) and OECD (2000). Nevertheless, Hines and
Rice (1994) emphasize the vague characterization of tax havens and that the classification to some extent
is arbitrary, which again makes the classification liable to selection bias. As a result, others who have made
separate lists, such as Palan et al. (2010), may have continued using these ”arbitrary” classifications and
potential circularity problems may have occurred.
Secondly, even-though DH2009 claims that tax haven status is time-invariant, their independent variable of
interest, governance index, cannot be said to be the same. The governance index changes each year; however,
in most cases, not by much. Nonetheless, the relative differences between tax havens and nonhavens can
become significant over time. Given that governance changes, it follows logically that tax haven status also
changes, and therefore, the lists of tax havens should also change with time.
Lastly, the causal inference in a cross-sectional analysis like theirs is, to some extent, limited. Presumably
ensuring no endogeneity problems or limiting them in a setting like this is very difficult (Esping-Andersen
and Przeworski, 2001). There is also a significant risk of having confounding variables that affect the
estimated relationship (Wooldridge, 2012). For instance, the governance index might affect the likelihood
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of a country becoming a tax haven; on the other hand, being classified as a tax haven may also affect
the governance index. Further on, variables in the error term, such as education or life expectancy, might
influence both governance quality and our dependent variable. If this is the case, then the governance
index coefficient will be biased (Collischon and Eberl, 2020). In general, it is challenging to ensure good
inferences, especially with only observations from one time period (Esping-Andersen and Przeworski, 2001).
Based on the above, we argue that DH2009 results cannot be interpreted causally. The results from 2004
presumably suffer from both omitted variable bias and perhaps have confounding variables too. The tax
haven classification they use is dichotomous and classified as somewhat arbitrary by Hines and Rice (1994).
Therefore, potentially suffering from selection bias since a country is not necessarily exclusively a tax haven
or nonhaven. After all, there is currently no worldwide accepted definition of tax havens (Cobham et al.,
2015). Thus, tax haven status should be assessed with a continuous variable, where neither classification
needs to be mutually exclusive. The Financial Secrecy Index offers such a continuous variable, where we
believe the FSI value is the most suitable indicator for our research purpose.
4.3 Robustness checks
Our main regression results portray a different picture than previous literature reports concerning gov-
ernance quality and tax haven status. Regarding the control variables, one observed that the GDP per
capita had a non-significant effect on the binary dependent variable in columns 1 to 3, consistent with
DH2009. However, with the FSI value as the dependent variable, the GDP per capita increased in size and
became significant.11 This is consistent with common economic literature, where better governance makes
a country more wealthy. For the population coefficient and the FSI value as the dependent variable, the
coefficient no longer negatively affects a tax haven. On the contrary, it becomes positive and significant at
the 1 % level. This finding is inconsistent with the perceived perception that tax havens typically are less
populated.
To further validate our findings, we created Table 4, where various regression models have been performed
to test our results robustness. Since mostly panel data and fixed effects have been used in our research, we
have only presented this in our robustness checks.
11The relationship between the FSI value and the GDP per capita is presented in Figure 6.
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Dependent variable:
Financial Secrecy Index Secrecy score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governance Index 0.095 0.054 0.298 0.012 −0.290 −1.360
(0.276) (0.191) (0.509) (0.732) (2.588) (2.525)
Log of GDP per capita 0.053 0.975∗ 0.554 12.487∗∗
(0.325) (0.543) (1.539) (4.857)
Log of population 0.057 0.029 −0.116 0.260
(0.037) (0.161) (0.143) (0.533)
Corporate tax rate −0.019∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.591∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.050) (0.219)
Sample All FSI > average Tax havens CTR ≤ 10 % All All
Observations 427 135 164 69 427 426
Number of countries 105 41 33 19 105 105
R2 0.001 0.043 0.045 0.008 0.00005 0.074
Adjusted R2 −0.343 −0.490 −0.265 −0.569 −0.344 −0.258
Note: That the Financial Secrecy Index is logged while the secrecy score is in its original format. Sample All is the full
panel data set. FSI > average includes only those countries with secrecy score above the average. Tax havens include only
those countries listed in subsection B as tax havens. CTR ≤10 % only includes countries with a corporate tax rate equal to
and below 10%. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses; ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level;
∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level.
In column 1 in Table 4 we wanted to see how the governance index’s magnitude changed when only applied
in a single regression. Compared with the governance index coefficient in Table 3, column 4, we see that
the coefficient is approximately five times as large. This could perhaps be explained by the positive and
significant GDP per capita, absorbing much of the effect. Nonetheless, the governance coefficient still
does not become significant. This certainly emphasizes that the relationship is far from strong enough,
even when applied in a single regression. Further on, we wanted to see if we could obtain any significant
coefficients for the governance index’s five indicators. Only five indicators are applied since regulatory
quality is disregarded due to potential multicollinearity issues (DH2009). The results in Table 9 show that
all five governance index measures are non-significant. Only the rule of law has a significantly different
magnitude wise effect than the governance index coefficient as a whole. Thus, our results support Rose
and Spigel (2007), showing that rule of law and political stability does not significantly impact tax haven
status.
In column 5 in Table 4, a single regression is applied, with only the secrecy score as the dependent variable.
Our intention with using the secrecy score was to isolate the effect of governance quality on a measure
intended to reflect the degree of transparency within a jurisdiction. An increased secrecy score represents a
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more opaque country and an increased likelihood of tax haven status. However, our results are inconsistent
with the popular view that governance quality makes a country more secret. We observe a negative
relationship, implying that countries will become more transparent as governance quality increases.12 One
potential reason for this inconsistency with previous literature is that the secrecy score likely reflects a
significant part of a country’s institutional quality. Therefore, a high secrecy score does not necessarily
imply that a country is more opaque than other similar nations but perhaps also identifies differences in
institutional quality between countries. This can be observed by looking at the top 25 countries on the
secrecy score in Table 13. Here, one observes that there is a combination of typical tax havens and less
developed countries. This can potentially be interpreted as an indication that tax havens have deliberately
implemented policies to increase secrecy, thus more opaque13. On the other hand, countries such as Angola
and Algeria have low institutional quality and, therefore, their secrecy score is of little value concerning tax
haven status.
In columns 2 and 3 in Table 4, only typical tax havens and countries with an FSI value above the average are
utilized. The idea behind column 2 is to try to capture the largest players that have potentially detrimental
effects when less transparent. Also, looking at typical tax havens in Table 6, and countries ranked by their
FSI value in Table 12, only 10 of the typical tax havens are in the top 25 of the FSI rankings. This enables us
to see how the governance index’s magnitude differs when only applying a fraction of the typical tax havens
to the full sample in column 3. In Figure 2, one could observe that the relationship between governance
and the FSI value is significantly steeper for tax havens compared to nonhavens. However, we wanted to
see the exact magnitude wise difference between the two samples. The results show that the typical tax
havens’ governance coefficient is approximately six times larger than for countries above average on the
FSI value. This underlines that Hines and Rice (1994), who initially choose the tax havens applied in our
models, are significantly more susceptible to the effects of governance and accordingly obtain higher FSI
values. This perhaps also highlights a focal point regarding the interpretation of the impact of governance
on tax havens. Shaxson and Christensen (2013) argue that if one assumes no poorly governed tax havens,
there will be no identifiable causation chain in the prescribed relationship. This is because countries that
are already well-governed are more likely to attract financial capital. Thus the effect of governance quality
is potentially over-estimated.
Additionally, two regression models were run, which excluded countries in the lowest quartile on governance
quality, and one where only countries above-average governance were included. The concept was to observe
the counterintuitive connection between governance and foreign welfare, where improved governance con-
tributes to a country becoming more harmful from a global perspective. For instance, one could assume that
an increase in governance only increases the likelihood of becoming a tax haven up until a certain threshold.
After that, it potentially flattens, until a certain level, where the governance becomes too “high”, and the
morality of a country’s rule-makers will have to surface. Thus, ending tax haven operations. This argument
is based on the belief that a well-governed country has diverse and ethical rule-makers, where exploiting
developing countries14 will not be tolerated. However, our results indicate no threshold where governance
quality becomes too high, prompting countries not to turn a blind eye to the harmful externalities their
actions impose on nonhavens.
In column 4 in Table 4, countries with a statutory corporate tax rate equivalent to or below 10% are used.
12The relationship between governance quality and the secrecy score can be seen in Figure 3.
13Tax haven countries in DH2009 are more secret for any level of governance, see Figure 3.
14The negative externalities from tax havens are, according to Schjeldrup (2015) most detrimental to developing countries.
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The intention was to exploit one of the specific characteristics of tax havens, namely low or zero taxation.
One could also expect a country with a low corporate tax rate to have a more considerable inflow of capital,
both legal and illegal. Therefore, they are potentially more susceptible to governance quality changes than
comparable high tax countries. However, the positive association between governance quality and the FSI
value is lower than in columns 2 and 3. This implies that restricting the sample to low-tax countries alone
does not change our current findings.
In column 6 in Table 4, the same variables as in column 6, Table 3 are applied, only now with the secrecy
score. Previously, we have argued that the secrecy score seems to capture more of a country’s institutional
part. At the same time, the FSI value is perhaps too broad, treating large countries like The United States
unfairly. Further on, since we have in Table 3 and in Figure 6, shown that increased wealth leads to higher
FSI values and governance, respectively. We wanted to see how the GDP per capita differed with the
secrecy score being the dependent variable.
Our results show that the governance coefficients magnitude drastically changes from column 5 to column
6, approximately five times larger in absolute value. This highlights the negative correlation between the
independent variables in our data. One can also observe that the coefficient has become negative, compared
to the main regression results. The result in column 6 is, in our opinion, evidence of the FSI value being
the preferred continuous measure of tax havens. This is because a negative relationship between tax havens
and governance seems highly unlikely and contradicts all common literature on tax havens.
Considering the GDP per capita, one observes that the coefficient is highly significant and magnitude wise
influential. Mara (2015) finds no evidence for governance quality, but a significant and robust effect of the
GDP per capita on tax haven likelihood. Our results support her finding with both the FSI value and the
secrecy score, which can be seen in appendix E. However, our findings are not robust to several different
variants, seen in column 2 and 4, in Table 4. Lastly, we want to reiterate that most interpretations of
coefficients in this subsection are performed on variables that are not significant at any of the standard
significance levels.
4.4 Additional results
In Figure 2, one observed a positive relationship between the governance index and the FSI value. However,
a significant positive relationship with fixed effects or OLS estimation in Table 3 has not been obtained.
Consequently, we reject the hypothesis and consider other political, institutional, and economic factors
related to tax havens.
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Table 5: Alternative measures of institutional quality related to tax havens
Dependent variable:
Financial Secrecy Index Secrecy score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption Perceptions Index 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.031 0.003 0.054
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.135) (0.123) (0.127)
Business Freedom Index −0.017∗∗ −0.131∗
(0.007) (0.078)
Log of GDP per capita 0.734∗ 0.800∗∗ 16.276∗∗∗ 16.809∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.368) (4.802) (4.858)
Log of population 0.109∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.312 0.281
(0.031) (0.030) (0.755) (0.768)
Corporate tax rate −0.038∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.597∗∗ −0.537∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.258) (0.247)
Observations 284 284 282 284 284 282
Number of countries 76 76 75 76 76 75
R2 0.040 0.095 0.133 0.0005 0.104 0.117
Adjusted R2 −0.338 −0.281 −0.230 −0.393 −0.268 −0.253
F Statistic 8.515∗∗∗ 5.227∗∗∗ 6.096∗∗∗ 0.098 5.783∗∗∗ 5.267∗∗∗
Note: The Financial Secrecy Index is logged while the secrecy score is in its original format. Clustered standard errors are
in parentheses; ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level.
In column 1 in Table 5, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is significant at the 5% level with a
coefficient of 0.021, leading to a one-unit increase in the CPI score, increasing the FSI value by 1.021%.
Looking at column 2, one can see that the relationship is robust when controlling for GDP per capita,
population, and corporate tax rate, as the CPI coefficient remains the same. The GDP per capita and
corporate tax rate are consistent with Table 3, column 5, while population differs. The population coefficient
is now positive and significant at the 1% level.
In column 3, the Business Freedom Index (BFI) is added to the regression. The CPI is now significant
at the 1% level, and the coefficient is equal to 0.027. If one goes from a CPI of 40 (Turkey) to a CPI of
85 (Switzerland), the FSI value is increased by 3.37 %. The coefficient for the BFI is equal to -0,017 and
significant at the 5% level. This means that a one-unit increase in the BFI leads to a 1.017% decrease in
the FSI value. The GDP per capita, population, and corporate tax rate still provide consistent results. In
fact, the coefficients are more significant than for the results in Table 3.
In column 4, 5 and 6 in Table 5, the secrecy score is the dependent variable. One observes that the CPI
is not significant for any of the reported regressions, while the BFI is significant and negative at the 10%
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level. A noteworthy result is the highly significant and magnitude wise important coefficient for the GDP
per capita in column 5 and 6. The result implies that the more wealthy a country becomes, the more secret
it becomes. This is consistent with perceptions of tax havens.
It should be noted that the effect of the GDP per capita is potentially overestimated. The reason is that the
Financial Secrecy Index currently only covers 133 countries. Many developing countries that typically have
high secrecy scores due to low institutional quality are not included. Therefore, potentially overestimating
the effect of GDP per capita on the FSI value and the secrecy score.
4.5 Corruption Perceptions Index and the Business Freedom Index
In this subsection, our findings related to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Business Freedom
index (BFI) in Table 5 are discussed. Also important shortcomings with the results, and an intriguing
finding considering institutions and the CPI are described.
In Table 5 one observes that the CPI is positive and significant, implying that local perceived corruption
affects tax haven likelihood. It is well documented in the literature that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
inflows decrease when corruption increases, and therefore the result seems reasonable. From Table 5, one
can observe how the CPI goes from significant to non-significant with the dependent variable being the
secrecy score. We have already argued that this could be related to variations in institutional quality
captured by the secrecy score. Accordingly, we only observe a significant and positive relationship between
the FSI value and the CPI.
Furthermore, we would like to specify that the CPI has been heavily criticized for its inability to track
corruption (Cobbham, 2013). Amongst others, due to the index being based on perceptions from experts,
typically professors, managers of big firms, and people in government (Transparency International, 2019a).
Since perceptions are not necessarily objective and representative facts, but rather opinions, these typically
vary within different groups of society. Therefore, only collecting answers from one group leads to a potential
selection bias. Furthermore, the CPI only tracks corruption in the “home country” but fails to capture
corruption enabled abroad (Tax Justice Network, 2020d). As a result the index does not capture the effects
of a country´s non-compliance with international rules. There are many critics of the CPI, amongst others
Cobham (2013), which recommends Transparency International to drop the index. Henry (2012) questions
why Switzerland, Singapore, and Luxembourg are ranked among the countries with the lowest degree of
corruption, knowing the secrecy they provide.
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Figure 4: List comparison of the Corruption Perceptions Index and the Financial Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network,
2020d)
From Figure 4, one observes that Switzerland is at the top of both the CPI and the Financial Secrecy Index.
From the CPI results, one can conclude that Switzerland’s perceived level of corruption is amongst the lowest
in the world. On the other hand, from the Financial Secrecy Index, we observe that Switzerland is among
the worst offenders in supplying foreign corruption (Tax Justice Network, 2020d). Conceptually, Henry
(2012), Table 3 and Figure 4, capture the obfuscation of institutions. Put differently, the Financial Secrecy
Index and the CPI would have completely different narratives in describing Switzerland. Perhaps, the
Financial Secrecy Index would emphasize how Switzerland is a major contributor to increasing corruption
overseas. Simply consider the amount of money flowing from Nigeria to Switzerland versus the amount
flowing from Switzerland to banks located in Nigeria (Tax Justice Network, 2020b). Illicit capital flows in
general move, from less developed countries to more wealthy and developed countries. This again leads
to increased inequalities in already impoverished countries such as Nigeria (Čihák and Sahay, 2020). On
the other hand, the CPI would portray an entirely different picture of Switzerland since it only focuses
on local corruption. It should be noted that the CPI is aware of the issues in comparing the two indexes
and emphasize that they continuously put pressure on leading countries to close loopholes (Transparency
International, 2019b).
For the BFI, one can observe a negative impact from an increase in the BFI on the FSI value and secrecy
score. Strictly speaking, a high degree of government efficiency in business regulations reduces both the
FSI value and the secrecy score. However, we deem this relationship as bogus, considering our research’s
purpose. Our purpose and intention behind incorporating the index was to try to estimate how easy it would
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be to both incorporate and operate an offshore-company. That is of interest since it is commonly perceived
that tax havens have extraordinarily lenient requirements when it comes to establishing offshore-companies
(Tax Free Today, 2017). For example, Sharman (2010) showed that the United States and the United
Kingdom have systems that allow anyone with an internet connection and minimal capital to establish an
anonymous company. One can also mention that Sharman et al. (2015) found that more typical tax havens
have a higher degree of corporate transparency than both the United States and the United Kingdom. This
is surprising and further evidence that supports our initial idea in using the Financial Secrecy Index as a
measure of tax havens.
As a consequence of the aforementioned, the association between the BFI, FSI value, and secrecy score
found in Table 5 is overlooked. There is, however, one example that could be mentioned, which we believe
supports our decision. Specifically, Switzerland and Panama are ranked as number 3 and 15 on the Financial
Secrecy Index, whereas, on the BFI, they are ranked at 50th and 60th place. The deviation between the
two indexes, we deem to be incorrect in terms of our analysis, or at least not what we intended to assess.
Rather, we agree with Sharman (2010) and Sharman et al. (2015). In particular, their analysis reveals that
traditional tax havens, but even major nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have




In this section, we will suggest an alternative hypothesis into what makes a tax haven. Among others, our
alternative hypothesis is based on the finance curse from Shaxson and Christensen (2013). Furthermore,
Schjeldrup (2015) is used to highlight certain externalities that tax havens inflict upon nohavens.
5.1 Finance curse
According to Shaxson and Christensen (2013), “excessive financial sector growth tends to reduce long-term
economic growth”. In other words, countries become captured by the financial industry, thereof the name
finance curse. The IMF and the Bank for International settlements support the view that financial sector
growth is not always positive. Shaxson (2019) contributes to this literature and exemplifies the relationship
in Figure 5, where the GDP growth rate and the financial development index is applied. One can, from
Figure 5, observe that countries such as Morocco and Poland are close to reaching the threshold in which
GDP growth turns. We also observe that the Gambia and the United States are at about the same GDP
growth. However, while the Gambia will benefit from an increased financial sector, the United States will
benefit from a reduction.
Figure 5: Relationship between the Financial Development Index and the GDP growth rate (Shaxson, 2019)
This implies that there is only a short-term benefit to becoming a tax haven. This short-term benefit
comes mostly from increased registration fees and licensing fees related to incorporating an offshore com-
pany. Čihák and Sahay (2020) argue that financial sector growth at a certain threshold no longer impacts
positively, but instead leads to increased inequality within a nation’s people. This is what we see happening
in the United States, where income inequality has increased since the 1980s (Pew Research Center, 2020).
According to Shaxson and Christensen (2013), one of the reasons for reduced economic growth is economic
and political capture. Economic capture describes how a financial sector of a certain size dismantles other
sectors in an area, such as agriculture and manufacturing, hence ruining the playing field for other sectors
and households. Secondly, high salaries in the financial industry attract talents which could have been used
more productively, at least from a societal point of view. Lastly, “Financialization,” where industries that
produce goods or add real value to the society are neglected due to an overly excessive financial sector taking
up all the attention. On the other hand, political capture describes how the elite of finance professionals
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uses sophisticated methods such as lobbying, to obtain more favorable terms. The lobbying power in
the financial industry is highly significant. Finance, insurance, and real estate companies alone spent 7,4
billion dollars on lobbying between 1998 to 2016 (Igan and Lambert, 2019). The considerable amount may
explain the rationale behind the statement made by former UK treasury employee Philiph Oppenheim. “In
developed established democracies, powerful and well-funded interest groups such as financial services have
captured government policy to their own ends, ensuring a benign fiscal environment for their industry”.15
5.2 Criminialization of finance and corruption
The financial sector is vital to the economic system of today. Through its ability to allocate funds to where
they are most needed, the financial sector ensures an efficient global economy. The common perception
that banks mainly finance households and firms is no longer accurate. Research by Lund et al. 2013,
revealed that the financial sector has dramatically changed in recent years. In between 1995 and 2007,
financing of households and companies only accounted for 25 % of the global share of financial services.
The new type of finance is the financial engineering part, where synthetic products are created, profits are
shifted, and where speculative proprietary trading has taken over. At the same time, the financial sector
has been involved in numerous scandals involving insurance-fraud, tax evasion, and mortgage fraud. All
were conducted by well-known banks such as HSBC, Credit Suisse, Barclays, and ABN Amro. According to
a report submitted to the UK Commission of Banking by the financial detective, Rowan Bosworth-Davies
a range of disturbing details concerning the British banking industry. “The British banking sector has
become an organized criminal enterprise which has been allowed to develop because of the criminogenic
environment in which it functions, which has resulted from the absence of any meaningful regulation, which
those who control and manage the banks would fear.”16
Additionally, Shaxson and Christensen (2013) argue that the issue appears to be more severe for smaller
financial centers or tax havens, which have governments that may be described as authoritarian. Typically,
authoritarian states have a strong central authority, where personal freedom and freedom of speech are
less prioritized than in typically democratic institutions. Evidence from previous health minister Stuart
Styvret, in Jersey, a British Crown Dependency, exemplifies the issue. “Jersey is governed by a crypto-
feudal oligarchy which, of itself, is captured by the international offshore banking industry. It is a gangster
regime, cloaked with the respectability of the trappings of the British establishment.”17 Syvret clearly
thinks that the financial sector’s size has surpassed the point where it is beneficial for growth, and his
description does not portray a well-governed jurisdiction, rather the complete opposite.
5.3 Asymmetric information and institutional quality
Schjeledrup (2015) emphasizes that through low transparency, tax havens create asymmetric information
that inflicts negative externalities upon nonhavens. For instance, the users of hidden bank accounts in
Switzerland only reap the benefits, such as increased income opportunities and more favorable terms for
initiating or continuing criminal activities. On the other hand, nonhavens only bear the costs for this type
of behavior. In general, less transparency leads to more complicated processes of figuring out who the real
beneficial owner of certain assets is since the owners of these bank account’s identities are hidden. Therefore,
there is no guarantee that the real owners can be held accountable for potential criminal activities. This
15Chapter quote from an article made by Philiph Oppenheim, published in in the Financial Times (Oppenheim, 2012).
16Chapter quote from Rowan Bosworth-Davies (2013).
17Chapter quote from Shaxson and Christensen (2013).
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can be exemplified with the Scandinavian Star accident on April 7, 1990, where 158 people died. The
investigation showed that the ship had several deficiencies and that the proper security protocol was not
conducted. The ship’s ownership was never found since it was registered in the Bahamas.18 This illustrates
one critical negative externality of tax havens, specifically, that the actual owners are not necessarily held
accountable for their actions. This potentially leads companies to place profitability above quality or safety
control since their identity is hidden.
One of the most detrimental effects of tax havens is the degradation of institutional quality in developing
countries, which is yet to be addressed. According to Schjeldrup (2015), tax havens most harmful feature is
how they reduce institutional quality and growth in developing countries. Tax havens make corruption more
accessible, thus enabling secrecy and anonymity for foreign capital holders. However, while where virtually
all OECD residents could directly profit from tax havens, it is mostly the ruling class in the developing
countries who can take advantage of tax havens. Therefore, in a developing country, tax havens might
cripple an entire institution or contribute to weakening the institution. This follows as tax havens cater to
the ruling elite’s self-interest, thereby serving as an opportunity for personal benefit (Schjelderup, 2015). In
other words, rent-seeking and corruption are believed to increase as a result of tax haven operations. There
are several examples where the ruling-elite in Nigeria and Congo used state finances to benefit themselves
by transferring funds to tax havens. Consequently, already disadvantaged countries face the most adverse
effects of tax havens.
5.4 The paradox
In the preceding subsections, a fundamental understanding of the potential implications a disproportionate
financial sector may have on the society under which it exists has been shown. We have also identified the
detrimental effect of tax havens on nonhavens and especially on developing countries. As a result, one may
question why a country wants to become a tax haven at all or, indeed, how is it possible that improved
governance quality should make a country more inclined to harm other countries?
If we consider a country that experiences improved governance quality and thus chooses to become a tax
haven, two clear implications would have to follow. Firstly, increasing governance quality should increase a
government’s capacity to successfully enact sound policies that favor both people and the institution. On
the other hand, becoming a tax haven increases financial activity and the resulting influx of hidden capital
into the country. The aforementioned has to logically follow from both improved governance quality and
becoming a tax haven. Nonetheless, we have also documented that becoming a tax haven may contribute
to regimes becoming captured politically and economically, leading the respective institutions to share
parallels with authoritarianism (Shaxson and Christensen, 2013).
Furthermore, in a thriving tax haven, the financial sector’s share of the overall GDP will grow exponentially,
and over time become extremely important, considering government revenue. Therefore, ensuring that a
country always stays within the framework of what defines a well-governed country is presumably very
difficult and potentially impossible. Thus, there seem to be two conflicting viewpoints here, where being
both concurrently is unlikely, but if the case quite the paradox.
Undoubtedly the definition of sound policies, or staying within the framework of a well-governed country,
mentioned above, is very subjective. For instance, in Norway, we have seen that certain political parties
18Information collected from Schjeledrup (2015).
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and organizations have emphasized that tax havens are not necessarily bad. An example from 2009 is where
the Norwegian Enterprise Confederation leader specifically noted that tax havens play an essential role in
legal business practices and should not be stigmatized just because of their unfavorable externalities.19
This reasoning is backed by Dharmapala (2008), which stresses that nonhavens are not necessarily worse
off as tax havens increase efficiency under certain circumstances and also reduce tax rivalry. Therefore,
some might argue that the positives attributes of tax havens outweigh the negatives.
Nonetheless, most countries try to avoid being classified as a tax haven due to the general understanding that
the overall impact is unfavorable. From a global perspective, it would be beneficial to reduce the influence
tax havens currently have on the global economy. Therefore, implying that an increase in governance would
make a country more likely to become a tax haven and thus reduce global wealth can most certainly be
characterized as a paradox.
5.5 Alternative hypothesis into what makes a tax haven
In Table 5, one could observe that an increase in the governance index had no statistically significant effect
on the likelihood of a country becoming a tax haven. Nonetheless, it seems essential to possess a certain
level of governance, highlighted by the fact that capital most always goes from poor to rich countries. We
have also shown a positive relationship between governance and the FSI value in Figure 2, where typical
tax havens are more susceptible to increases in governance. Furthermore, in Figure 3, we observed that
tax havens used in DH2009, on average, had higher secrecy scores than comparable nonhavens for a given
governance index score. Overall, we propose an alternative hypothesis based on the finance curse and a
perception that common indexes, such as the governance index and the CPI, might be artificially high. In
our opinion, the problems seem to be more eminent for typical tax havens.
Our alternative hypothesis suggests that indexes such as the governance index and the CPI are inflated.
This implies that the relationship that DH2009 shows is biased. We argue that it is counterintuitive to
believe that countries that have such an extensive financial sector, such as tax havens, are not impacted by
either political or economic capture in any way. We believe that tax havens typically become victims of an
aggressive financial sector with mobile capital, which can instantly be relocated to other jurisdictions. This
gives the owners of mobile capital an edge on tax haven governments. Consider this; currently, both tax
haven governments and the users of tax havens are part of a mutually beneficial relationship. Presumably,
both parties suffer significant losses or increased tax liabilities if tax havens are abolished. However, in
many cases, mobile capital owners are less sensitive to exactly which tax haven is responsible for safely
managing their capital. Furthermore, tax havens can only reap benefits from mobile capital, which they as
nonhavens or if not chosen as a preferred tax haven, cannot benefit from at all. This leads to an uneven
balance of power, where tax haven governments have less leverage than large multinational corporations
considering potential offshore locations. Large multinational corporations are clearly aware of this and
exploit this to their full advantage. We believe that this leads to certain handshake agreements, which are
not compatible with being characterized as a well-governed country.
Further on, the governance index by Kaufmann and Kray (2019) most likely captures most of how local
citizens are treated which, concerning tax haven status, perhaps could be considered less important. For tax
haven status, it is how non-residents are treated and the quality of the ring-fenced legislation which matters.
19Based on details from an interview in Aftenposten 16.12.2009.
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This is presumably essential to mobile capital holders. Therefore, considering that the governance index
most likely represents local conditions and considering the examples we have shown regarding Jersey and
the banking sectors influence on the society, an inflated governance index’s hypothesis is strengthened.20
Lastly, one can consider a revealed preference argument, implying that tax havens acknowledge that their
ring-fenced legislation is harmful. Otherwise, tax havens would encompass both domestic firms and residents
within the favorable regime. This follows as only non-residents can exploit the loopholes tax havens provide,
while residents’ immobile funds are taxed under local legislation. All tax havens are aware of this and know
that all negative externalities are shifted onto nonhavens, while tax havens only reap positive externalities.
Intentionally running such an operation, knowing the consequences, we argue not to be compatible with
such high governance index scores many tax havens have.
Based on the aforementioned, we suspect that the governance index and other indexes, such as the CPI,
potentially are inflated. This implies that the picturesque image these common indexes portray perhaps is
not an accurate description of the reality in today’s tax havens.




This thesis has highlighted the misconceived perception that tax havens are well-governed countries by
demonstrating no significant positive relationship between tax havens and governance quality. We believe
that the dichotomous approach used by DH2009 where a jurisdiction is either a tax haven or not is subject
to co-founding variables and selection bias in deciding on a tax haven list. The independent variable of
interest, the governance index, is time-variant, and therefore re-examining the relationship over time is
essential. Using the Financial Secrecy Index and a fixed effects regression, we find no significant positive
relationship between tax haven status and governance quality. Thus, we have disproved some of DH2009
findings, regarded by many as the most influential evidence on governance quality and tax havens. However,
we find a positive significant relationship between corruption and the Financial Secrecy Index. This we
interpret as evidence that tax havens cannot, at least on paper, have extensive corruption as it is not
possible to attract foreign mobile capital.
Furthermore, we find it counter-intuitive to believe in a positive relationship between an increase in gov-
ernance quality and the likelihood of a country becoming a tax haven. The general thinking is that an
improvement in governance quality should favor both citizens and the institution, however becoming a tax
haven does not seem to benefit residents at all, perhaps the opposite. Much of the reason for this is poten-
tially due to tax havens becoming economic and politically captured, which may cause relevant institutions
to share similarities with authoritarianism. Our empirical results show no significant positive correlation
between governance quality and tax havens, implying that they are consistent with the country capture
phenomenon introduced by Shaxson and Christensen (2013).
As a result of our analysis, it is highly questionable if tax havens should be considered well-governed at
all. Therefore, we propose an alternative hypothesis that argues that the governance index and the CPI is
inflated. It is also very likely that the governance index captures too much of the local conditions, which is
not inherently important considering tax haven status. Throughout the thesis, several examples reinforce
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A Explanation of data
Governance Index: measures the quality of institutions and traditions within a country and how they are
being exercised. The political variable is constructed by Kaufman and Kray (2019), taking values between
-2.5 and 2.5, where a high score indicates a well-governed country. The variable is normally distributed with
a mean equal to zero and unit variance. The score is averaged across five indicators of institutions. These
indicators are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness,
rule of law and control of corruption. The data is extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
web-page.
Financial Secrecy Index: is an annual political ranking of jurisdictions according to their degree of
financial secrecy and world scale of offshore financial activity (Tax Justice Network, 2020b). The score is
aggregated into one final score, where the secrecy component consists of qualitative data of laws, regula-
tions, and exchange of information. In contrast, the financial activity component is a measurement of a
jurisdiction’s share of cross-border financial transactions provided to non-residents. The data is extracted
from the Tax Justice Network web-page. Note that the Financial Secrecy Index has a cutoff point on the 31
December in the preceding year of the published version. Hence, the latest edition of the Financial Secrecy
Index, published in 2020, is matched with 2019 data.
Secrecy score: is one of the two components making up the aggregated Financial Secrecy Index. It is a
qualitative variable going from 0 to 100, and it measures a jurisdiction’s transparency and willingness to
cooperate and exchange information with other national authorities. A high score means low transparency
and a low willingness to comply with international norms and standards to fight money laundering. On
the other hand, a low score indicates a high degree of financial transparency and compliments towards
international norms (Tax Justice Network, 2020b).
Tax haven: is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the jurisdiction is classified as a tax haven, according
to DH2009. If such a list had been created today, it would have been natural to add more tax havens.
GDP per capita: is the gross domestic product per year divided by the midyear population and adjusted
for purchasing power parity to account for price differences across countries. The variable is expressed in
the current international US dollar. The data is extracted from The World Data Bank. For jurisdictions
that are missing data, the gaps are closed using data from the CIA´s World Factbook, where the closest
year is used if the exact year is not available.
Population: The data is extracted from the World Data Bank. For jurisdictions that are missing data,
the gaps are closed using data from the CIA´s World Factbook, where the closest year is used if the exact
year is not available.
UN member: is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the country is a member state of the United
Nations organization at each of the five years included in the data-set. The data is extracted from the
United Nations member state list.
Landlocked: is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the country is landlocked. The data is extracted
from Dempsey (2017).
Corporate tax rate: is the statutory corporate tax rate for each country. The data is extracted from
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KPMG (2020) and their worldwide corporate tax rates table.
Corruption Perceptions Index: measures the perceptions of corruption in a country´s public sector,
both political and administrative corruption. The variable takes values from 0 to 100, where 100 is equal to
no corruption. The data is available for 176 countries from 2001 to 2019 and is extracted from Transparency
International (2019).
Business Freedom Index: measures how efficient and effortless a business can be started, operated, and
closed based on government regulation. The index is measured from 0 to 100, where 100 is equal to the
most efficient and freest country to do business in (The Heritage Foundation, 2019). The data is available
for 181 countries from 1995 to 2020 and is extracted from The Global Economy (2020).
Regional dummies: are binary variables created for Europe, Asia/Pacific, Central Asia, the Americas,
Africa, and the Middle East. Country´s are given the value of 1 for the region they belong to. The data is
extracted from The World Data Bank.
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B List of pre-defined tax havens
Table 6 shows the tax havens used to replicate DH2009. Initially, the list made by Hines and Rice (1994)
contained 41 tax havens, but the governance index is missing for a few of these countries. Thus only 35
tax havens are applied.
Table 6: Countries classified as tax havens




























St. Kitts and Nevis
St.Lucia






Multicollinearity is a frequent problem in regression analysis and occurs when there is a high correlation
among regressors, leading to unreliable estimates (Allison, 2012). Multicollinearity is often measured by
the variance inflation factor (VIF), which measures how much of a coefficient´s variance is inflated because
of linear dependencies with other variables. How high a VIF is accepted differ among researchers, but a
common rule is that VIF´s below five is accepted. According to Allison (2012), multicollinearity can safely
be ignored for control variables (Allison, 2012).
Looking at Table 7 and 8, one can see that our regression results do not encounter any problems with
regards to multicollinearity, as all VIF´s are below 5.
Table 7: VIF estimates for Table 3
Variables Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 6
Governance index






















































Table 8: VIF estimates for Table 5
Variables Column 3 Column 5
Corruption perception index
Business Freedom index














D Additional regression results
Table 9 shows the governance index’s five components, and where all the components have been run as a
single fixed effects regression, with the Financial Secrecy Index as the dependent variable. Table 10 shows
the governance index’s five components, and where all the components have been run as a single fixed
effects regression, with the secrecy score as the dependent variable. Table 11 is the same as Table 3, shown
in subsection 4.1, but here the regional dummies are displayed.
Table 9: Governance index components with the Financial Secrecy Index as the dependent variable
Dependent variable:
Financial Secrecy Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voice and Accountability 0.144
(0.296)






Control of Corruption 0.104
(0.187)
Observations 416 419 415 423 415
Number of countries 104 104 102 103 102
R2 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002
Adjusted R2 −0.350 −0.341 −0.342 −0.338 −0.342
F Statistic 0.413 1.728 0.453 0.343 0.607
Note: The dependent variable Financial Secrecy Index is logged. Regulatory quality is disregarded due to potential multi-
collinearity issues. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses; ∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level;
∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level.
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Table 10: Governance index components with the secrecy score as the dependent variable
Dependent variable:
Secrecy score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voice and Accountability 1.495
(3.624)






Control of Corruption −3.567∗
(2.037)
Observations 416 419 415 423 415
Number of countries 104 104 102 102 102
R2 0.001 0.0003 0.0002 0.003 0.016
Adjusted R2 −0.350 −0.348 −0.344 −0.336 −0.322
F Statistic 0.309 0.078 0.061 0.898 5.089∗∗
Note: Regulatory quality is disregarded due to potential multicollinearity issues. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses;
∗significant at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level.
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Table 11: Main regression results with regional dummies displayed
Dependent variable:
Tax haven (=1) Financial Secrecy Index
2004 2004 2019 2019 2010-2019 2010-2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governance index 0.657∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.057 0.154 0.015 0.045
(0.256) (0.033) (0.039) (0.128)) (0.304) (0.307)
Log of GDP per capita 0.119 0.026 0.042 0.430∗∗∗ 0.652∗ 0.623∗∗
(0.216) (0.031) (0.038) (0.138) (0.350) (0.353)
Log of population −0.402∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.032 0.035
(0.078) (0.013) (0.013) (0.037) (0.090) (0.088)
UN member (=1) 0.444 0.014 0.034 −0.767∗
(0.416) 0.119) (0.124)) (0.442)
Landlocked (=1) 0.082 0.001 −0.001 0.038
0.367) (0.051) (0.051) (0.228)
Corporate tax rate −0.027∗∗
(0.014)
Europe (=1) 2.381 -0.082 -0.122 −0.654∗∗
(2.414) (0.071) (0.080) (0.264)
Central Asia (=1) 3.711 0.098 0.056 −0.527∗
(2.436) (0.072) (0.081) (0.307)
Asia/Pacific (=1) 2.510 −0.003 −0.057 −0.203
(2.184) (0.077) (0.080) (0.278)
Americas (=1) 3.671 0.160∗∗ 0.1390∗ −0.525∗∗
(2.315) (0.069) (0.075) (0.220)
Middle East (=1) 3.743 0.091 0.108 −0.129
(2.751) (0.115) (0.120) (0.345)
Africa (=1) 2.726
(2.221)
Constant 0.944∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗ −1.214
(0.323) (0.376) (1.504)
Model Probit OLS OLS OLS Panel FE Panel FE
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Observations 208 208 208 125 426 426
Number of countries 208 208 208 125 125 125
R2 0.355 0.343 0.375 0.017 0.026
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.309 0.320 −0.329 −0.322
Log Likelihood −51.216
Akaike Inf. Crit. 124.433
Residual Std. Error 0.309 0.312 0.796
F Statistic 10.842∗∗∗ 10.263∗∗∗ 6.829∗∗∗ 1.825 2.092∗
Note: Robust standard errors in column 1 to 4 and clustered standard errors for column 5 and 6 in parentheses; ∗significant
at the 10 % level; ∗∗significant at the 5 % level; ∗∗∗significant at the 1 % level.
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E Additional tables and figures
Figure 6 plots the governance index for 2019 against the log of GDP per capita in 2019 for all countries in
the panel data set. Tax havens byDH2009 are given in red, while all other countries are blue.
Figure 6: Plot of the governance index and GDP per capita for tax havens and nonhavens in 2019
Figure 7 plots the FSI value, from the latest edition of the Financial Secrecy Index in 2020, and the log of
GDP per capita in 2019 for all countries in the panel data set. Tax havens by DH2009 are given in red,
while all other countries are blue.
Figure 7: Plot of the Financial Secrecy Index and GDP per capita for tax havens and nonhavens in 2019
Figure 8 plots the secrecy score, from the latest edition of the Financial Secrecy Index in 2020, and the log
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of GDP per capita in 2019 (in PPP terms, expressed in US$) for all countries in our panel data set. Tax
havens by DH2009 are given in red, while all other countries are blue.
Figure 8: Plot of the secrecy score and GDP per capita for tax havens and nonhavens in 2019
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Table 12 shows the top 25 jurisdictions ranked by their respective FSI Values, while Table 13 ranks after
the secrecy score. The data is collected from the latest released edition of the Financial Secrecy Index in
2020.












British Virgin Islands 619
















Table 13: The top 25











United Arab Emirates 78





Antigua and Barbuda 76
Kenya 76
Bahamas 75
St. Kitts and Nevis 75
Liechtenstein 75
Gambia 75
Curacao 75
Samoa 75
Montserrat 75
Vietnam 74
Switzerland 74
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